Recent calls for a revision of standard evolutionary theory (SET) are based in part on arguments 2 about the reciprocal causation. Reciprocal causation means that cause-effect relationships are 3 obscured, as a cause could later become an effect and vice versa. Such dynamic cause-effect 4 relationships raise questions about the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes, as 5 originally formulated by Ernst Mayr. They have also motivated some biologists and 6 philosophers to argue for an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES). The EES will supposedly 7 expand the scope of the Modern Synthesis (MS) and Standard Evolutionary Theory (SET), 8 which has been characterized as gene-centred, relying primarily on natural selection and largely 9 neglecting reciprocal causation. I critically examine these claims, with a special focus on the 10 last conjecture and concludeon the contrary-that reciprocal causation has long been 11 recognized as important both in SET and in the MS tradition, although it remains 12 underexplored. Numerous empirical examples of reciprocal causation in the form of positive 13 and negative feedbacks are now well known from both natural and laboratory systems.
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dependence has also been suggested to be important in maintaining diversity of ecologically 239 equivalent species (e. g. those formed by sexual selection alone) on regional scales (M'Gonigle 240 et al. 2012), and it might also play an important role in community ecology through priority 241 effects (De Meester et al. 2016) . Even more generally, positive feedbacks and runaway 242 processes have been suggested to be important in human social evolution in coalition formation 243 and cooperative networks (Gavrilets et al. 2008 ) and in ecosystem ecology and climate science 244 (Scheffer et al. 2001; Malm 2007) . 245 246 Reciprocal causation has also a key role in the field of "eco-evolutionary dynamics" (Schoener 247 2011; Hendry 2016), where the focus are the bidirectional feedbacks between ecological (e. g. 248 population dynamics) and evolutionary processes (e. g. genetic change within populations). 249 Eco-evolutionary dynamics is expected when ecological and evolutionary time scales converge, 250 such as in the case of rapid evolution, e. g. due to human-induced environmental changes 251 (Hendry et al. 2017) . Under such scenarios does not only ecological change affect genetic 252 change, but also vice versa: genetic changes can feed back in to ecology and influence 253 population dynamics (Sinervo et al. 2000; Yoshida et al. 2003) . Note that this breakdown of the 254 separation between ecological and evolutionary time scales can be viewed as a problem for 255 certain modelling approaches, such as Adaptive Dynamics (AD), where a strict separation 256 between ecological and evolutionary processes is a core assumption (Dieckmann and Doebeli 257 1999; Waxman and Gavrilets 2005). Such dynamic feedbacks between ecology and evolution 258 will without doubt continue to be explored in the future, and they show that reciprocal causation 259 forms a key part of a rapidly growing research field that has largely developed independently 260 from niche construction theory. 
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These other synthesis-attempts are more modest in their scope than the EES, the latter which 275 embraces an explicit counterpoint to SET, i. e. a dialectical approach. As I have discussed and exemplified above, reciprocal causation is hardly controversial among 324 evolutionary biologists and widely recognized in several subfields in evolutionary biology.
If reciprocal causation is then so widely recognizedat least in several key fieldswhy then and consequences for matching habitat choice (Edelaar and Bolnick 2012), quantitative studies ontogeny in studies of (say) frequency-dependent selection, eco-evolutionary dynamics, co-415 evolution and analyses of selection is likely to yield many novel and important insights. 416 However, the reason that development has not been incorporated in that many previous studies 417 in this field is not that the researchers in question rely on an outdated and simple view of 418 unidirectional causation, as implied by Laland et al. (2015) . The reason is more likely a practical 419 one: it is extremely difficult and empirically challenging to understand and study reciprocal 420 causation even at single ontogenetic level, such as among adults. I therefore disagree with thinking could have a constructive influence on evolutionary theory cautioned against uncritical 465 extenson of dialectics to heredity and development. Maynard Smith's cautionary point should 466 also be taken seriously by those today who argue for constructive development, including 467 Laland et al. (2015) . In a modest form, constructive development is entirely compatible with 468 quantitative genetics theory, where it is explicitly recognized that gene expression is strongly 
